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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 3 WINTER 1975 NUMBER 1
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT
ADMIRALTY RULES AND SNIADACH-FUENTES:
A COLLISION COURSE?
JOSHUA M. MORSE, III*
A collision at sea can ruin your entire day.
-Thucydides**
I. INTRODUCTION
Without hesitation, any layman could recognize that the terms
"maritime lien," "maritime attachment," and "arrest of a vessel"
must belong to the field of maritime law. He would not, however,
realize as quickly that these terms describe doctrines forming an
integral part of that body of law. Nor would a landlubber be likely
to know that, from its inception, maritime law has never been a part
of the more familiar common law but has retained its identity as a
distinct body of law concerned exclusively with the legal problems of
ships, seamen, and the sea.
The reasons for the existence of a separate body of law called mari-
time law and of a system to enforce and administer it called maritime
jurisdiction are not immediately apparent. Society seemed to feel that
it needed such a unique system of laws to control sea-related legal
issues., The continuance of this system today indicates that there is
still a felt need for a distinct maritime jurisdiction to apply this law
and to mold new laws of the sea.
The purpose of this article is to focus upon threats to that jurisdic-
tion presented by current social and economic conditions. The article
questions (1) whether maritime in rem and quasi in rem seizures of
vessels really serve the ends for which they were designed, and (2)
whether it is appropriate to accept a system that is inconsistent with
recent decisions of the Supreme Court-decisions that challenge the
justification for maritime arrests of vessels and maritime attachment.
Dean and Professor of Law, Florida State University. J.D., University of Mississippi.
This article is being submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for com-
pletion of the J.S.D. degree from Yale University.
** Quoted in R. HEINL, DIaT. OF MILITARY AND NAVAL QUOTATIONS 56 (1966).
1. This is strictly true at least as to international ocean commerce.
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In particular, the article explores the threat to procedures for executing
maritime liens2 and to maritime attachment in admiraltys posed by
the line of cases holding that some prehearing seizures violate the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The article also con-
siders the threat posed by these cases to the jurisdiction of the federal
courts as constitutional admiralty and maritime courts.4
Because prejudgment seizure of property was such common legal
procedure for centuries, until recently any effective challenge to its
continued use seemed impossible. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.5
which held that attachment of a debtor's wages before a hearing violat-
ed the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 6 was the first
Court opinion to challenge these seizures directly.7 In Fuentes v.
Shevins the Supreme Court clarified and extended the basic holding
in Sniadach, applying the Sniadach rule to all property, not just wages
or "necessaries." 9 These two decisions now constitute a challenge to
2. The specific rules dealing with in rem actions to execute maritime liens are
FEm. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. C, E.
Since 1966, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have applied to all admiralty and
maritime actions as well as civil actions. FE. R. Civ. P. 1. The unique characteris-
tics of maritime law and procedure required the addition of the Supplemental Rules
for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. A-F cover mari-
time attachment, garnishment, in rem actions, possessory, petitiory, partition, and
limitation of liability concursus proceedings. In addition, specific references to maritime
actions appear in FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h), 14(c), 38(e), 82.
For a view that the unification of the rules of civil procedure with admiralty pro-
cedure creates a threat to the continued existence of the in rem action and thus to
separate maritime law, see Wiswall, Admiralty: Procedural Unification in Retrospect and
Prospect, 35 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 36, 46 (1968).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B, E.
4. Admiralty and maritime matters are one of the specific constitutional grants of
jurisdiction to courts of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The in rem action
is exclusively within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States District Courts. The
Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867).
5. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
6. Id. at 339-42.
7. The pre-Sniadach cases merely hold that "a hearing must be had before one is
finally deprived of his property ..... Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611
(1974). See also id. at 611 n.10.
8. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). For an interesting and detailed account of the background
of the case, see Abbott & Peters, Fuentes v. Shevin: A Narrative of Federal Test Litiga-
tion in the Legal Services Program, 57 IOWA L. REV. 955 (1972). Fuentes came to the
Supreme Court on appeal from a three-judge district court for the Southern District
of Florida. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970). For purposes of argu-
ment and decision, Fuentes was combined with a similar case appealed from a three-
judge federal district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Epps v. Cortese, 326
F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Parham v. Cortese, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
9. In extending the Sniadach rule to include all types of property, the Court stated:
[I]f the root principle of procedural due process is to be applied with objectivity,
it cannot rest on such distinctions [between types of property and gradations in
1975] ADMIRALTY RULES
all prejudgment seizures of property, 10 including foreign attachments1
or any other form of seizure used to acquire jurisdiction.
The concept of the maritime lien as the source of exclusive ad-
miralty jurisdiction in rem is unique." Moreover, the character of
the transactions occurring in worldwide ocean commerce is entirely
different from that of the transactions discussed in Sniadach and
Fuentes. This article isolates and examines these differences to deter-
mine whether they are sufficiently substantial to permit a prejudg-
ment seizure of property to acquire jurisdiction in admiralty despite
the limitations imposed by Sniadach-Fuentes.
II. ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME JURISDICTION
A. Historical Summary
The definition of maritime actions has been subject to frequent
change. In the jealous competition among the early English courts,
the common law judges restricted maritime matters to ridiculously
narrow limits."3 The scope of maritime jurisdiction has expanded great-
their importance]. The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of "property" generally ....
It is not the business of a court adjudicating due process rights to make its own
critical evaluation of those choices and protect only the ones that, by its own
lights, are "necessary."
407 U.S. at 90 (footnote omitted).
10. Some commentators have questioned the vitality of Fuentes. See, e.g., Hobbs,
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.: The 1974 Revised Edition of Consumer Due Process, 8
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 182 (1974). In Mitchell, both the majority opinion, 416 U.S. 600,
620 n.14, and the concurring opinion of Justice Powell, 416 U.S. 622, 623-24, indicated
that the Fuentes holding would be unchanged by Mitchell.
See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192, 4194
(U.S. Jan. 22, 1975) (Stewart, J., concurring):
It is gratifying to note that my report of the demise of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 US. 600, 629-636, seems to have been
greatly exaggerated. Cf. S. Clemens, Cable from Europe to the Associated Press,
reprinted in II A. Paine, Mark rwain: A Biography 1039 (1912).
11. For a thorough explanation of the ramifications of the holdings in Sniadach
and Fuentes, see Comment, Foreign Attachment After Sniadach and Fuentes, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 342 (1973). See also Note, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Require-
inents, 82 YALE L.J. 1023 (1973).
12. The statute implementing the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction
includes a clause "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are
otherwise entitled." See notes 31-34 and accompanying text infra. As a result, the state
courts are considered to have concurrent jurisdiction for in personam actions. Knapp,
Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 648 (1900). In Madruga v. Superior Court, 346
U.S. 556, 560 (1954), the Court restricted exclusive jurisdiction to in rem actions, "that
is, where a vessel or thing is itself treated as the offender and made the defendant .... "
Accord, The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555, 556 (1867); The Moses Taylor, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 412 (1866).
13. For example, to come within admiralty jurisdiction, contracts had to be both
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ly in the intervening years, passing through phases like the ebb and flow
of the tides,14 until it has approached the point that a fact situation
having a reasonably substantial effect upon maritime affairs or com-
merce invokes maritime or admiralty jurisdiction. For example, con-
tracts are subject to this jurisdiction if they are of a maritime nature;' 5
torts are similarly subject if they are caused by a ship, 6 or have a re-
lationship with traditional maritime activities and occur within a
maritime locale,1 7 even if the maritime locale is ill-defined. Maritime
jurisdiction is not limited to the sea-it extends to navigable waters,
even those lying wholly within one state,18 and to navigable vessels.' 9
There were several factors that distinguished admiralty jurisdiction
in English legal history.20 The English rules restricting admiralty
jurisdiction to cases possessing a nexus with ocean commerce 2' were
soon rejected in this country.2 2 Those rules that restricted admiralty
jurisdiction to matters occurring on the high seas23 and not under seal
have been so stretched and amended that now a nexus with water
transportation suffices to satisfy them.2
4
related to and executed on the sea. See Morse v. Slue, 86 Eng. Rep. 159 (1672), where
the rules of admiralty did not apply because the ship was infra corpus comitatus.
14. See generally The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443,
453-60 (1851).
15. Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 259,
264 (1950).
16. 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
17. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
18. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 29 (1957).
19. Id.
20. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 18, at 1-11. For a history of
the development of English Admiralty jurisdiction, see generally 1 W. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 531-32, 543-49, 552 (7th ed. 1956); 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 342-43 (1826); F. WISWALL, TIlE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
AND PRACTICE SINCE 1800 (1970).
21. See, e.g., letters patent issued to Dr. Godolphin, Judge of the Admiralty Court
in 1658, covering, e.g., "all causes of contract made beyond the seas concerning shipping or
navigation or dammadges .... " R. MARSDEN, MARsDEN'S ADMIRALTY CASES 340, 342 (1885).
22. The generally accepted beginning for the expansion of federal maritime jurisdic-
tion in this country is the opinion of Justice Story in De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (No.
3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815), which interpreted the constitutional grant to cover the
broadest delegation of jurisdiction. This interpretation was extended to inland water
commerce in Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 555 (1866); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851);
Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847). For resistance to this change, see
generally The Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175 (1837); Ramsay v.
Allegre, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611 (1827); The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 428 (1825).
23. Justice Story uncharacteristically clung to the restrictive English tidewater test
for jurisdiction in The Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175 (1837), and
The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
24. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972); Note,
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Development of maritime jurisdiction in England began with the
establishment of the office of Lord High Admiral and the creation
of a centralized court for admiralty. This court replaced the courts
of various ports, but when it became a threat to the power of the
common law courts, its jurisdiction was severely limited. Admiralty
jurisdiction survived, nevertheless, and, during the colonial period,
courts of Vice-Admiralty in British North America possessed extensive
jurisdiction. 25
When the British colonies in North America achieved indepen-
dence, the founding fathers had centuries of experience upon which to
pattern maritime jurisdiction in the new nation. Even with this
precedent to guide them, they still had to resolve the inconsistency of
incorporating a single, uniform law of the sea into a constitution in-
tended for a nation to be composed of thirteen federated states. Sur-
prisingly, however, discussion or dissent was almost totally lacking-o
when the Constitutional Convention decided to extend the judicial
power of the United States to "all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction." 27 The selection of the words "admiralty and maritime"
was a fortunate choice; while the meaning of "admiralty" has been
disputed, the term "maritime" encompasses continental sea law that
might not be considered part of English Admiralty.2 8
B. The Constitutional Grant of Maritime Jurisdiction
Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave effect to the constitu-
tional grant of jurisdiction. Federal district courts were given exclusive
and original jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime matters, "saving
to suitors, in all cases, the right to a common law remedy where the
common law is competent to give it."29 Thus district courts have
cognizance of any admiralty or maritime action even when the familiar
requirement of diversity of citizenship or federal question is not met.30
But the Judiciary Act of 1789, while professing to give "exclusive"
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal district courts, erased
Admiralty Jurisdiction: Executive Jet in Historical Perspective, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 355 (1973).
25. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 18, at 8-10.
26. Putnam, How the Federal Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 CORNELL
L.Q. 460 (1925).
27. U.S. CONsT. art. HI, § 2.
28. See Canfield, The Uniformity of the Maritime Law, 24 MICH. L. REv. 544 (1926).
29. 1 Stat. 76-77 (1789). The statute now appears in slightly changed form as 28
U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). See generally Beeks & Moss, The Exclusive Admiralty Jurisdiction,
27 WAsH. L. Rv. 176 (1952).
30. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 18, at 18-20. But if jurisdictional require-
ments are met, jury trial may be had on the law side. Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
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much of this exclusiveness with the saving clause. As revised in 1948,
that section now provides that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction exclusive of the
courts of the States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving
to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are other-
wise entitled.31
This saving clause controls any in personam action, 2 and such an ac-
tion may be brought in federal or state courts. Maritime law does not
include equitable remedies 3 Only with respect to in rem actions to
execute maritime liens and concursus proceedings to limit a shipown-
er's liability is the jurisdiction of admiralty exclusive.3 4
1. The Maritime Lien.-Today, almost every suit or ground for
relief in admiralty creates a maritime lien.3 5 This alone shows how
different this lien is from a "shoreside" lien both in theory and in effect.
Other major differences between actions brought in federal courts
under the "exclusive" grant of admiralty jurisdiction16 and those
brought in state courts3 7 include: (1) article III, section 2 of the United
States Constitution grants jurisdiction in all admiralty and maritime
cases to the federal courts;38  (2) the fifth, rather than the fourteenth,
amendment delimits due process requirements in admiralty; (3) ex-
clusive federal admiralty jurisdiction requires the existence of a
maritime lien, which must be executed by an in rem action in ad-
miralty; 39 (4) under the personification theory of in rem jurisdiction
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
32. Black, supra note 15, at 265.
33. 1 E. JHIROD & A. SANN, BF-NEDICr ON ADMIRALTY § 191 (7th ed. 1974). The com-
bined rules of admiralty law and equity which result from the FED. R. Civ. P. could
cause a different result.
34. "The maritime lien can be 'executed' (which is the admiralty terminology
for 'foreclosed') only by an Admiralty Court acting in rem." G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
supra note 18, at 482.
35. Id. at 512. Some of the claims listed by Gilmore and Black as not having lien
status under the general maritime law have been given lien status by state or federal
statute. See, e.g., Master's lien for wages against vessel, 46 U.S.C. § 606 (1970); Ship
Mortgages Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84 (1970). "[W]here no lien is conferred by the general
maritime law the state can confer a lien in rem provided there is a maritime cause of
action. To illustrate, state statutes creating liens in rem for marine insurance premiums
are enforceable in admiralty since the contract is maritime in nature." Varian, Rank and
Priority of Liens, 47 TUL. L. REv. 751, 763 (1973).
36. See note 29 supra.
37. The term "state court" here includes the federal district courts exercising
diversity jurisdiction.
38. See note 4 supra.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). In Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583 (1857), a
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a vessel is a jural entity;40 (5) comity, rather than the full-faith-and-
credit clause, governs international recognition of judgments; and (6)
the Supreme Court has prescribed by rule the procedures for arrest
of a vessel before notice to the owner.4 1
It is generally accepted that the modern maritime lien was judicial-
ly created to meet the needs of early nineteenth century ocean com-
merce.4 2 The modern lien first appears in the opinion of the Privy
Council in The Bold Buccleugh,43 a case involving the conflicting
rights of a shipowner for collision damages and of a bona fide pur-
chaser with no notice of the collision lien. The claims were caught
in the tangled procedural net of an in rem action in England and a
quasi in rem action in Scotland.44 From this suit emerged the following
definitive characteristics of a maritime lien, still valid today: (1) the
lien is secret, attaching to the vessel and remaining with it without
notice to anyone; 45 (2) the lien is "indelible" in the sense that a pur-
chaser other than one who takes by execution or foreclosure in rem in
admiralty receives imperfect title;4 6  (3) to be enforceable the lien
does not require that the lienor possess the vessel;4 7 (4) a collision re-
sults in a lien on the ship itself and gives rise to an action in rem; if
the owners do not appear, the lien may be enforced against the vessel
as a jural entity;48 (5) "[a] maritime lien is the foundation of the pro-
ceeding in rem, . . . that [is] in all cases where a proceeding in rem is
the proper course, there a maritime lien exists . . .";49 and (6) because
a proceeding in rem against a vessel differs from a foreign or maritime
attachment against the owners, "it follows, that the two suits being
vessel was seized by foreign attachment in state court when a seaman attempted to arrest
the vessel in a state in rem proceeding to execute a maritime lien for seamen's wages.
The Court held that the state court could not sell the vessel free of the maritime
lien since an admiralty proceeding in rem was necessary for the execution of the lien,
and admiralty jurisdiction meant exclusion. See also The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
411 (1866). The distinguishing feature of the in rem proceeding is that the sale of the
vessel clears the vessel of all existing maritime liens and "conveys title free and clear
of all encumbances . D..."  ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 131 (1970), citing
Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co., 237 U.S. 303, 306 (1915); Knapp, Stout
& Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 647-48 (1899).
40. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 18, at 483.
41. See 7A J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE IJf B.03-.05 (2d ed. 1972).
42. "Anglo-American lien law is a 19th century creation." G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
supra note 18, at 484.
43. Harmer v. Bell, 13 Eng. Rep. 884 (P.C. 1851).
44. Id. at 884-85.
45. Id. at 890-91.
46. Id. at 884, 891.
47. Id. at 890.
48. Id. at 889-90.
49. Id. at 890.
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in their nature different, the pendency of the one cannot be pleaded
in suspension of the other. '"
50
2. The In Rem. Action.-The concept of a maritime lien has be-
come increasingly intertwined with the in rem action by which the
lien is executed:51 an in rem action lies52 only to execute a maritime
lien and, conversely, a maritime lien can be executed only in an in
rem proceeding.5 3 Thus the "exclusive in rem jurisdiction" of the
federal district courts requires a maritime lien to support it.
54
There are two theories of in rem jurisdiction, the personification
theory5 1 and the procedural theory. 56 Under the personification theory,
the court views the vessel as a jural person and arrests the vessel to
start an in rem proceeding that fixes the liability of the vessel rather
than the liability of the owner. The procedural theory treats the
seizure of the vessel as a device to coerce the owner to answer; the
suit then is metamorphosed into an in personam action against the
owner 5 7 just as in a quasi in rem action in equity.
50. Id. at 891.
51. Hebert, The Origin and Nature of Maritime Liens, 4 TUL. L. REV. 381, 386-87
(1930); Rogers, Enforcement of Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 47 TUL. L. REv. 767 (1973);
Toy, Introduction to the Law of Maritime Liens, 47 TUL. L. REv. 559 (1973).
52. "The only object of the proceeding in rem . . . [is] to carry [the maritime lien]
into effect. It subserves no other purpose.
"The lien and the proceeding in rein are, therefore, correlative-where one exists,
the other can be taken, and not otherwise." The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
213, 215 (1867). To the same effect, see Justice Story's opinion in The Nestor, 18 F. Cas.
9, 11 (No. 10,126) (C.C.D. Me. 1831). While a petitory libel is brought against a vessel
and may seem to be an exception to this rule, the process also runs against the adverse
parties and claimants. FED. R. Civ. P. Susp. R. D.
53. G. GILMoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 18, at 482.
54. The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 411 (1866). See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 18, at 31, 34.
55. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 18, at 483.
56. We now proceed to discuss the liability in Admiralty of the ship by
the negligent navigation of which the damage was occasioned. In dealing with this
branch of the subject it is almost impossible to avoid personifying the ship and
speaking of her as the actual wrongdoer. . . But it must not be forgotten that
in speaking of a ship as a wrongdoer or "in fault" for a collision, we are using a
figure of speech which is apt to be misleading. There are . .. cases which .. .
countenance .. . the doctrine that . . .the ship is the real defendant .... But it
is submitted that this view of the liability of the ship in Admiralty is not well
founded, and that at the present day it would not be followed .... The process
of Admiralty Courts against the ship seems clearly to have originated . . .
simply as a ready and effectual means of compelling the wrongdoer to appear
and defend the action, or to make recompense.
R. MARSnFN, THE LAW OF COLLISIONS AT SEA 60-61 (lth ed. 1961) (4 British Shipping
Laws) (footnotes omitted).
57. The personification theory adopted by the English courts in The Bold Buccleugh,
166 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1850), and followed in this country until the last two decades
has been rejected now by the English courts. For an extensive attack on the English courts
ADMIRALTY RULES
The English courts now follow the procedural theory, but early
in its history the United States adopted the personification theory.
Legal writers and historians have speculated about the origin of the
latter theory.18 Prominent writers have alternately hoped for and
predicted its early demise, but The Steamship Yaka51 indicates that the
doctrine retains some vitality. In Yaka, a longshoreman, precluded by a
federal statute from suing his employer, brought his action for per-
sonal injury against the ship.60 The court of appeals had held that,
since neither the shipowner nor the employer could be personally
liable for the injury, the in rem action failed because it was unsupport-
ed by personal liability? 1 The Supreme Court evaded the question by
deciding that the employer-charterer was personally liable.62 While
most recent cases have found concurrent personal and in rem liability,
some interpret Yaka to mean that the Court accepted the personifica-
tion theory."
In Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585,64 the Court considered
in rem jurisdiction arising from an order to transfer venue. The own-
er of damaged cargo had sued the vessel in rem and the owner in
personam. Although the vessel could not have been arrested in the
Western District of Tennessee, the owner could be sued there. The
district court ordered a transfer.6 5 The Supreme Court, treating the
two suits as one and regarding the personality of the vessel as a fiction,
upheld the transfer. While the Court cited with apparent approval
critics of the personification doctrine, it did so guardedly:
in their use of authority, as well as the validity of the authorities cited, see F. WISWALL,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND PRAt-rIcE SINCE 1800, 155-208, es-
pecially 198-203 (1970). Still, Wiswall recognizes that the English rule was announced in
The Dictator, [1892] P. 304, which held that an in rem proceding was a procedural
device for obtaining personal jurisdiction over the shipowners and that the shipowner
by submitting to the jurisdiction of the court is liable in personam for any judgment
rendered even though greater than the value of the vessel and the bond given for its
release. F. WISWALL, supra, 158-61.
58. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 25-34 (1881).
59. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
60. Id. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act applies to em-
ployees on navigable waters of the United States, excluding masters and members of
the crew, and makes the remedy provided by the Act exclusive and in place of all
other liability of the employer. 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3)-(4), 905 (1970).
61. 373 U.S. at 411.
62. Id. at 412. The record owner was Waterman Steamship Corporation, but the
plaintiff's employer, Pan Atlantic Steamship Corporation, was the bareboat charterer.
The bareboat charterer as owner pro hac vice was the one held personally liable (a
bareboat charterer bears liability similar to a common law independent contractor).
63. Toy, supra note 51, at 564.
64. 364 U.S. 19 (1960).
65. Id. at 20. The action was transferred from the Eastern District of Louisiana
to the Western District of Tennessee.
1975]
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[T]he fiction is one that certainly had real cause for its existence in
its context and in the day . . .in which it was created. A purpose
of the fiction . . .has been to allow actions against ships where a
person owning the ship could not be reached, and it can be very
useful for this purpose still.66
There are still a substantial number of circumstances in which the
vessel is regarded as liable although the owner is not. Negligent acts
of compulsory pilots neither chosen nor controlled by the owner can
create a lien on the vessel 6 but cannot create personal liability for the
owner. Demise or bareboat charterers with similar legal relations to
the owner can also create maritime liens on the vessel 68 without giving
rise to personal liability for the owner. The Yaka Court, while
professing to base its decision on personal liability, made the vessel
liable for the act of an employer-charterer to whom the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 69 granted immunity
and who was neither the owner of the vessel nor the agent of the
owner.70
III. THE CHALLENGE TO MARITIME ATTACHMENTS AND ARRESTS
OF VESSELS
A. The Sniadach-Fuentes Limitations
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,71 the Supreme Court fired
the opening salvo of a successful attack upon prejudgment seizures
of property. 72 Sniadach held that if a debtor was not given notice and
opportunity to be heard, garnishment of his wages violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 73 While the Sniadach
opinion emphasized the coercion and hardships experienced by the
debtor in a garnishment proceeding, 74 the Court rested its holding on
the lack of notice to the debtor and of opportunity for him to be
66. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
67. The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1868); Logue Stevedoring Corp. v. The Dal-
zellance, 198 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952).
68. The Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464 (1901).
69. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970).
70. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 411 (1963).
71. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
72. The pre-Sniadach cases dealing with this area held only that "a hearing must
be had before one is finally deprived of his property and do not deal at all with
the need for a pretermination hearing .... ".Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600, 611 (1974).
73. 395 U.S. at 339, 342.
74. Id. at 340-42.
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heard before seizure of his property.7 5 The opinion stressed that wages
were "a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in
our economic system. '76 Seizing upon these words some judges re-
fused to apply the holding of Sniadach to cases in which the property
taken was not a necessity.77
In Fuentes v. Shevin 7  the Supreme Court interpreted Sniadach
broadly and invalidated Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes. 79
Calling the lower courts' restriction of Sniadach to "necessities of life"
a "very narrow reading,"80 the Court chose to ignore that not all the
chattels in Fuentes were necessities."' Thus Fuentes extended Sniadach
to seizures of any property.8 2 The Court, however, reiterated its state-
ment in Sniadach8 3 that in certain "extraordinary situations" seizures
without notice or opportunity to be heard would still be valid .
Three factors had to be present before a seizure without an opportunity
for hearing could be valid: (1) the seizure must be necessary "to se-
cure an important governmental or general public interest"; (2) prompt
action must be necessary; and (3) the state must maintain control
75. Id. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion is largely devoted to this issue. Id. at
342-44.
76. Id. at 340.
77. Brunswick Corp. v. J & P Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir. 1970); Epps v.
Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127, 133-34 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324
F. Supp. 1011, 1015-16 (N.D. Ga. 1971); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp.
604, 607 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954, 957 (S.D. Fla. 1970),
rev'd sub nor. Fuentes v. Shevin 407 U.S. 67 (1972); American Olean Tile Co. v.
Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150, 151-52 (D. Hawaii 1970); Michael's Jewelers v. Handy,
266 A.2d 904, 906 (Conn. App. Div. 1969).
78. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
79. Id. at 85-90, 93, 97.
80. Id. at 88.
81. In Fuentes the chattels were a gas stove and a stereophonic phonograph. Id. at
70. In the Pennsylvania cases consolidated with Fuentes, three of the appellants claimed
household goods while the fourth claimed child's clothes, furniture, and toys. Id. at 71-72.
82. Id. at 86, 89-90. In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W.
4192 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975), the Supreme Court spoke on this precise issue. The Court
said:
It may be that consumers deprived of household appliances will more likely
suffer irreparably than corporations deprived of bank accounts, but the probability
of irreparable injury in the latter case is sufficiently great so that some procedures
arc necessary to guard against the risk of initial error. We are no more inclined
now than we have been in the past to distinguish among different kinds of
property in applying the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 4194.
83. 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969), citing Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S.
594, 598-600 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947); Coffin Bros. & Co.
v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928).
84. 407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
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through a governmental agent who initiates the seizure under the
standards of a "narrowly drawn statute."'8 5
These three factors were echoed in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,'"
where the Court upheld the Louisiana sequestration procedure. This
procedure allowed a lienholder upon a verified affidavit to seek se-
questration of the encumbered property without prior notice or op-
portunity for a hearing. In upholding the procedure, the Mitchell
Court noted that (1) the resolution of conflicting property rights is
an important state interest; (2) prompt action was necessary because
the debtor, by transferring possession of the property, could defeat the
seller's vendor's lien; and (3) Louisiana required that a judge authorize
the writ.8 7
Any new course set by Mitchell has been altered by North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,a8 in which the Court came back on
the Sniadach-Fuentes course. The North Georgia Court reaffirmed its
adherence to Sniadach-Fuentes principles and refused to limit appli-
cation of those principles to certain types of contracts or property.89
The Mitchell deviation was carefully boxed: the court delimited the
Mitchell exception to Sniadach-Fuentes to cases where (1) the statute
was carefully drawn to require factual rather than conclusory allega-
tions warranting sequestration; (2) the writ was subject to judicial
scrutiny and control before issuance; and (3) the debtor was entitled
to an "immediate hearing" after the seizure and to dissolution of the
writ if the creditor-plaintiff failed to prove the facts alleged in support
of the writ. 90
B. Foreign Attachment-An "Extraordinary Situation"?
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,9 decided two days
after Mitchell, the Court again referred to the three Fuentes factors
in upholding Puerto Rico's seizure of a yacht pursuant to a forfeiture
statute. The significant governmental interest was "[to prevent] con-
tinued illicit use of the property and [to enforce] criminal sanctions. ' '9 2
Prompt action was necessary; otherwise, the yacht could be removed
85. Id. at 91.
86. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
87. Id. at 604-609. The Court specifically reserved decision on whether a court
functionary could authorize sequestration. Id. at 606 n.5.
88. 43 U.S.L.W. 4192 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975).
89. Id. at 4193-94.
90. Id. at 4194. See also opinion of Powell, J. (concurring in the judgment but not
in the opinion), setting forth his ideas of the requirements of due process. Id. at 4195.
91. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
92. Id. at 679. The nature of the interest makes Pearson Yacht analogous to the
public weal cases. See notes 110-15 and accompanying text infra.
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easily from Puerto Rico's jurisdiction. The final requirement-that
the state maintain control of the proceedings-was also satisfied; the
Court noted that the seizure was initiated by Commonwealth officials
acting pursuant to statute, not by "self-interested private parties.
'
"
9 3
Whether a foreign attachment without notice or opportunity for a
hearing will fall within the exception to the Sniadach-Fuentes rule is
questionable. In Pearson Yacht the Court treated the seizure of prop-
erty in order to conduct forfeiture proceedings as a significant govern-
mental interest. One might think that this question had been resolved
by Sniadach and Fuentes. Both Sniadach and Fuentes seemed to cite
with approval those cases upholding foreign attachments,9 4 but neither
case explained how existing foreign attachment procedures could be
reconciled with the three prerequisites for a valid prejudgment seizure
imposed by Fuentes. This apparent conflict has led commentators9"
and courts 6 to different opinions about the validity of prejudgment
seizures of property to acquire jurisdiction.
In both Sniadach and Fuentes the Court cited Ownbey v. Morgan-7
to illustrate that a foreign attachment necessary for jurisdiction was
an exception to the Sniadach-Fuentes rule. 9s Ownbey, however, only
challenged the requirement that the defendant post bail before he
could present a defense.99 The Court's opinion was limited to this
93. 416 U.S. at 679.
94. 395 U.S. at 339; 407 U.S. at 90, 91 n.23.
95. Compare Comment, Fuentes v. Shevin: Its Treatment by Louisiana Courts and
Effect upon Louisiana Law, 47 TUL. L. REV. 806, 810 (1973): "[Fuentes] left untarnished
the doctrine of Ownbey v. Morgan [256 U.S. 94 (1920)]," with Comment, supra note 11,
at 344: "The Court clearly indicated its intent to include summary attachment pro-
cedures within the scope of the Sniadach-Fuentes rationale."
96. See, e.g., Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D.
Pa. 1971), af'd, 456 F. 2d 979 (3d Cir. 1972); Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F.
Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); Property Research Financial Corp. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 233 (Ct. App. 1972); Michael's Jewelers v. Handy, 266 A.2d 904 (Conn.
App. 1969); City Finance Co. v. Williams, 4 CCH CON. CR. GUIoE § 99, at 893 (D.C. Ct.
Gen. Sess. 1969). In what must be considered a novel approach, one state made no at-
tempt at all to reconcile the prerequisites for a valid prejudgment seizure with the
Court's apparent approval of foreign attachments. Instead, it limited Sniadach to wages
and declined to be bound by Fuentes at all (on the basis that the 4-3 vote in Fuentes
was less than a majority of the full bench). See Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmers, 502
P. 2d 1327 (Ariz. 1972). For an examination of the issues raised in the rejection of a
,Supreme Court decision by a state court, see Note, Is a 4-3 Decision of the United
States Supreme Court the "Supreme Law of the Land"?, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 312 (1974).
97. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
98. See note 94 supra. It was the defendant who argued that seizure without notice
or hearing was constitutional if he were allowed a hearing before his property was
condemned. 256 U.S. at 104.
99. 256 U.S. at 108-09. The Court set out the applicable portions of the Delaware
statute in the margin of the opinion. Id. at 101 n.l.
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narrow issue; prehearing seizures were neither challenged nor ruled
upon. Therefore, the reliance of the Fuentes Court on Ownbey for this
exception to the rule seems misplaced.
McKay v. Mclnnis'00 is another case that is usually interpreted by
commentators and courts as holding that a foreign attachment neces-
sary for jurisdiction is valid. But McKay was concerned only with a
prejudgment seizure of property to preserve resources for satisfying
judgments. 101 The seizure was not necessary to acquire jurisdiction;
defendant McKay had been served with a summons.11 2 The only issue
in that case was whether the Maine statute, which allowed attachment
without an affidavit showing the reason for the seizure or prima facie
proof of good faith, deprived the defendant of property without due
process of law.10 3 The influence of McKay, a one line memorandum
opinion, has also been weakened by Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Sniadach14 and his comments in Fuentes,05 in which he
questioned the vitality of the Court's per curiam opinion in McKay.
To say that Ownbey-McKay hold that a seizure to acquire juris-
diction does not violate due process requirements is to ignore the
facts and opinions of these two cases. Ownbey-McKay should not be
used to justify such seizures. Yet many courts rely upon the reference
100. 279 U.S. 820 (1929), af'g 141 A. 699 (Me. 1928).
101. 141 A. at 701. The Maine statute was a rescript of a colonial statute of Massa-
chusetts. The court stated that the right of attachment here did not arise from the
common law but "rests solely on statute." Id. The statute in question authorized the
commencement of any action except special writs by 1) "attach[ing] the goods and
estate of the defendant," and 2) "for want thereof to take the body [of the defendant]"
or 3) by "an original summons, with or without an order to attach goods and estate." Id.
While the statute had no express provisions on the point, the courts had interpreted the
statute to allow attachment without affidavit or bond so that this interpretation was
said to be law by "the statutes now in force." 141 A. at 701, quoting from Bond v. Ward,
7 Mass. 128 (1810).
102. 141 A. at 701.
103. Id. The Maine statute was unanimously held unconstitutional by a three-
judge court in Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me.
1973). The Massachusetts statute upon which the Maine statute drew was likewise held
to be unconstitutional by a three-judge court. Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp.
741 (D. Mass. 1972).
104. 395 U.S. at 343-44 (Harlan, J., concurring).
105. 407 U.s. at 91 n.23: "It is much less clear what interests were involved
in [McKay v. Mclnnis], decided with an unexplicated per curiam opinion simply citing
Coffin Bros. [& Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928)] and Ownbey [v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94]
... . As far as essential procedural due process doctrine goes, McKay cannot stand
for any more than was established in the Coffin Bros. and Ownbey cases on which it
relied completely." Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, supra, involved the levy by a state
superintendant of banks to protect depositors of a bank which had closed its doors.
This case more nearly satisfies the three requirements of Fuentes: (1) governmental or
public interest, (2) need for prompt action, and (3) state action based on a narrowly
drawn statute (407 U.S. at 91), than any other case cited.
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to Ownbey in Sniadach and Fuentes to uphold foreign attachments
used to acquire jurisdiction. 106 These courts ignore the restrictions
placed upon Ownbey and McKay by the Court in Fuentes.'07 In
Fuentes the Court vitiated McKay and limited Ownbey to those cases
where foreign attachment is "necessary" to "secure jurisdiction."'' 8
Consequently a seizure to acquire jurisdiction should be upheld only
as an "extraordinary exception" subject to the qualifying rules of
Fuentes.'0 9
Except for Ownbey, all of the "extraordinary situation" cases cited
in Fuentes involved the public weal. Contaminated food,11° bank
failures in the great depression era, 1 ' misbranded drugs,1 2 tax col-
lection,'"3 and wartime price regulations are all issues of vital concern
to the public and the government. But even in these areas of govern-
106. See, e.g., Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., 456 F.2d 979 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972). "It is quite apparent that notice as a pre-condi-
tion to an attachment might well defeat the primary purpose behind an attachment,
i.e., to compel an appearance." Id. at 981. "[F]oreign attachment provides an immediate
and certain basis on which to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. It
thereby constitutes a greater inducement for such a defendant to appear and con-
sequently accomplishes one of the principal objectives underlying enactment of foreign
legislation." Id. at 982. See also U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004, 1021
(D. Del. 1972): "This is not a case like Fuentes where the statutes allowed 'summary
seizure' when no more than [a] private gain is directly at stake . . . . As previously
,noted a state has a legitimate interest in the exercise of judicial jurisdiction .... Seizure
for the purpose of securing such jurisdiction in a state court, accordingly, serves, in the
words of the Supreme Court, 'a most basic and important public interest.' " See also
Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); Tucker v. Burton,
319 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1970); Property Research Financial Corp. v. Superior Court,
100 Cal. Rptr. 233 (Ct. App. 1972); Robinson v. Loyola Foundation Inc., 236 So. 2d 154
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970); City Finance Co. v. Williams, 4 CCH CON. CR. GUIDE
§ 99,893 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1969).
107. The restrictions were spelled out by reference to the cases:
In three cases, the court has allowed the attachment of property without a prior
hearing. In one, the attachment was necessary to protect the public against the
same sort of immediate harm involved in the seizure cases-a bank failure. Coffin
Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29. Another case involved attachment necessary
to secure jurisdiction in state court-clearly a most basic and important public
interest. [citing Ownbey] It is much less clear what interests were involved in the
third case, decided with an unexplicated per curiam opinion simply citing Coffin
Bros. and Ownbey .... McKay cannot stand for any more than was established
in the . . . cases on which it relied completely.
407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 90-91.
110. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
111. Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); accord, Fahey v. Mallonee,
332 U.S. 245 (1947).
112. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
113. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
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mental concern the limitations listed in Fuentes apply. 1 4 Usually
courts balance the interests of the parties and the public to decide
if a procedure satisfies the requirements of due process."15 Now, in the
case of seizures, they must also require that the Fuentes qualifications
are satisfied.
C. Seizures "Necessary" To Secure Jurisdiction
Seizures necessary to secure jurisdiction were given as one example
of the exception to the Sniadach-Fuentes rule. Citing Ownbey, the
Fuentes opinion said that a seizure of property "necessary to secure
jurisdiction" was "clearly a most basic and important public in-
terest. ' '11 6 The Court's use of the limiting word "necessary" requires
a determination of what seizures are "necessary to secure jurisdic-
tion.''"1
With the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, a state no longer
was able to choose its own definition of jurisdiction. Thereafter, due
process limitations were applied to proceedings in the forum state.
In Pennoyer v. Neff"" the Court, recognizing that conflicting interests
usually require a balancing test, allowed the plaintiff to sue but limited
the defendant's quasi in rem liability to the value of the seized property.
A plaintiff no longer had to chase elusive defendants across state lines
if he could attach or garnishee property within the state."19
114. See 407 U.S. at 90-91.
115. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970): "The extent to which procedural
due process must be afforded . . . depends upon whether the recipient's interest in
avoiding [grievous] loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication."
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965) (footnote omitted): "The requirements of due
process are a function not only of the extent of the governmental restriction imposed, but
also of the extent of the necessity for the restriction." See also Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360, 363 (1959); Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951)
(concurring opinion by Frankfurter, J.); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 372 F.2d 807, 811 (2d
Cir. 1967).
116. 407 U.S. at 91 n.23; accord, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)
(a defendant should "be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of
any significant property interest, except for extraordinary situations where some valid
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the
event.")
117. 407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
118. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
119. Compare "So long as the Courts insisted on a restrictive concept of personal
jurisdiction and required service of process as a requisite of a valid default judgment,
the quasi in rem jurisdiction served the useful purpose of mitigating the rigors of
securing personal jurisdiction," Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Ren Juris-
diction, 76 HARv. L. REV. 303, 305 (1962), with "[WIhere the action is brought to enforce
a personal liability of the defendant ... [t]he existence of property within the [forum]
state . . . will not of itself be a basis for jurisdiction to enter a judgment . . .upon
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In the past, intangible property posed jurisdictional problems
despite Pennoyer because the situs of the res was not concrete. While
there has been considerable discussion concerning this issue,'12 0 courts
tend to regard the location of the garnisheed defendant as the situs
of an intangible.1 21 Thus, a foreign corporation indebted to the de-
fendant or holding a defendant's assets may be garnisheed in any juris-
diction in which it does business. 22 The development of "long-arm
jurisdiction"'123 has led to the garnishment of intangible and unliqui-
dated choses in action if held by nonresident corporations having
sufficient minimum contacts 124 with the forum state.
125
the personal claim. There must be either personal jurisdiction or the property must
have been attached or seized in some way at the beginning of the suit . . . .Where
there is . . . seizure, . . . and the requirement of reasonable notice has been met,
the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the in personam claim and to
render judgment upon it. But if personal jurisdiction has not also been acquired, the
effect of this judgment must be limited to the property attached and cannot be satisfied
out of any other property." F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 630-31 (1965).
120. See Carrington, supra note 119. See also Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits
Against Nonresident Claimants, 49 YALE L.J. 241 (1939); Von Mehren & Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Note,
Attachment of Corporate Stock: The Conflicting Approaches of Delaware and the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1579 (1960); Comment, Garnishment of
Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
550 (1966).
121. See, e.g., Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), where the Court allowed the
garnishment of a debt owed by a transient nonresident of the forum state and upheld
the resulting judgment as valid against the property seized.
122. In Seider v. Roth, 216 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1966), the court upheld the garnish-
ment of the policy limits of an automobile liability insurance policy as a debt reachable
by the plaintiff, though unliquidated and though no judgment of negligence or liability
had been obtained against the insured. Garnishment was upheld even though the
accident occurred in Vermont. Accord, Barrios v. Dade County, 310 F. Supp. 744
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (attaching unliquidated proceeds of liability insurance policy covering
Dade County, Florida, so as to give the court jurisdiction of the defendant to the
extent of the policy coverage). See also Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.
1969). For an outline of some of the undesirable consequences of extension of this
jurisdiction so as to allow attachment of unfixed liability under liability insurance policies,
see Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many or Putting Seider Back into Its Bottle,
71 COLUM. L. REV. 660 (1971); Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment of Liability Insurance,
43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1075 (1968); Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 58 (1968).
123. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
124. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
125. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 316 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
569 (1958). A group of musicians sued their employers, their labor union, and a New
York trustee who oversaw funds collected from their wages by their employer and
diverted to the trustee. Personal service was had upon the employer and personal jurisdic-
tion was obtained over the union. Jurisdiction was sought over the trustee by service
in the State of New York. The court held that the intangible obligation on the part
of the employer had no situs in fact, and felt that "the solution must be sought in the
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Atkinson v. Superior Court12 6 eliminated some of the differences
between quasi in rem and in personam jurisdiction. Ignoring the
fictitious situs of the res1 21 and without acquiring possession, control of,
or "power" over the funds owed, the Atkinson court upheld its quasi
in rem jurisdiction by using the "minimum contacts"'12 8 criterion the
Supreme Court developed in International Shoe'29 to justify in per-
sonam jurisdiction. The Atkinson holding is one more step toward
unifying the jurisdictional criteria justifying in personam jurisdiction
and those justifying quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Except in unusual circumstances the states have reached an ac-
commodation that permits a much freer use of personal jurisdiction."0
Thus the "necessity" for quasi in rem jurisdiction is now significantly
diminished.1 31 Some commentators believe that Sniadach-Fuentes
limits quasi in rem attachments to acquire jurisdiction by the same
factors that limit other exceptional seizures: general public concern,
need for prompt action, and strict governmental control.' 3
general principles governing jurisdiction over persons and property rather than in an
attempt to assign a fictional situs to intangibles." 316 p.2d at 964. "The relevant
contacts [of the trustee] with this state are significant, however, in deciding whether due
process permits exercising a more limited or quasi in rem jurisdiction .... Id. at
965. "[T]he multiple contacts with this state fully sustain the jurisdiction of the
superior court to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over the intangibles in question." Id.
at 966.
126. 316 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
127. Id. at 964.
128. Id. at 966.
129. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
130. Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUp. CT. REV. 241;
Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and The In Personam Jurisdic-
tion of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denkla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 569, 623-24
(1958); Note, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations-An Analysis of Due Process, 104
U. PA. L. REV. 381-82 (1955).
131. See Ehrensweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Developments in the Law-State-Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1960); Note, The Requirement of Seizure in the
Exercise of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction: Pennoyer v. Neff Re-Examined, 63 HARV. L. REV.
657, 670-71 (1950). "[A] state can subject a person to its jurisdiction by service of process
anywhere in the country, so long as the litigation has substantial local elements. What
remains of the aspect of Pennoyer that precluded extraterritorial service is difficult to
see, although some authorities with more tenacity than persuasiveness still profess the
new rule to be only a qualification of the old." Hazard, supra note 130, at 275.
"When the rule [in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950)] is made clear . . . the presence of property in the jurisdiction loses the vestiges
of its special jurisdictional significance . . . . That being so, there is nothing left by
which to differentiate proceedings in personam and those in rem, and the keystone of
Pennoyer's conceptual structure is gone." Id. at 277.
Professor Carrington and others have offered serious proposals for the abolition of
quasi in rem jurisdiction. Carrington, supra note 119.
132. "[T]he seizure of property for jurisdictional purposes is only justified in very
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Attachments to secure jurisdiction in federal courts are subject to
the same requirements as other provisional remedies, such as garnish-
ment and replevin. 1 3 Since International Shoe"4 there is less need for
seizures to obtain jurisdiction."3 If the courts can obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction, there seems to be neither need nor justification for
seizure of property without prior hearing. Both the California cases13 6
and the Wisconsin practice 3 7 eliminate the real need for seizure without
notice and hearing except in truly unusual and extraordinary cases.
Even against a nonresident, the jurisdictional requirements imposed
by Pennoyer have been so weakened that seizure is no longer necessary
to give a court jurisdiction to render a judgment enforceable in any
other state. 38 If (1) property of the nonresident is within the court's
jurisdiction, and (2) the court has notified the defendant-owner that
an enforceable claim against the property has been asserted, a judg-
ment in the forum state, at least to the value of the property, will be
given full faith and credit in any other state.
limited circumstances which conform to the 'extraordinary situations' criteria listed
in Fuentes. . . .And where seizure does result in jurisdiction, a hearing . . . must be
held promptly ...." Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements,
82 YALE L.J. 1023, 1032 (1973) (footnote omitted). See also Clark & Landers, Sniadach,
Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355, 366-72
(1973); Comment, Foreign Attachment After Sniadach and Fuentes, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
342, 352, 356-58 (1973). These views are supported by the Court's application of Fuentes
in Pearson Yacht. See notes 91-93 and accompanying text supra.
133. "Seizure is not justified where the quasi in rem device is not necessary to
secure jurisdiction in state court, nor where jurisdiction cannot be defended as 'an
important governmental or general public interest.' " Note, supra note 132, at 1032.
134. See note 129 supra.
135. Carrington, supra note 119, at 306.
136. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 316 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1957), cert denied, 357 U.S. 569
(1958); Comment, Civil Procedure-Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 548,
557-59 (1970). See criticism of usual practice in Carrington, supra note 119, at 307-10.
137. Prior to Pennoyer v. Neff, the courts in a number of states did not require
any seizure and rendered purported personal judgments against the nonresident. In
response to the case, most of these states came to require some form of seizure prior
to judgment in cases involving a personal claim . . . .But the Wisconsin courts
have continued to treat seizure as unnecessary for jurisdiction. The Wisconsin re-
quirement remained unchanged: the property must be within the state at the
commencement of the action but need only be specifically described in the affidavit
.. .or .. . the complaint, for the court to have jurisdiction to issue a judg-
ment binding as to that property [citing Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 106
N.W. 821, 826-27 (Wis. 1906), af'd on other grounds, 208 U.S. 570 (1908)]. If the
property is removed from the state or sold to an "innocent" purchaser before
judgment is rendered, the judgment is void. . . . [This is] not an element which
affects jurisdiction.
Note, The Requirement of Seizure in the Exercise of Quasi In Rem jurisdiction: Penn.
oyer v. Neff Re-Examined, 63 HARV. L. REv. 657, 661 (1950) (footnotes omitted).
138. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 316 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569
(1958).
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Since seizure usually is unnecessary for jurisdiction, 189 nothing re-
mains to support general public or governmental interest, a necessary
element in the Sniadach-Fuentes exception that permits prehearing
seizures. The need for prompt action, a second element of the excep-
tion, also vanishes. The last element, that of a narrowly drawn statute
administered by an official who also determines the necessity, is nearly
always absent. 40 Nearly all foreign attachment statutes parallel equity
practice and allow seizures to secure jurisdiction over nonresidents' 4'
or absconding debtors. The nonresident may still be subject to such a
statute even though he does business in the state, has the required
"minimum contacts," or has agreed to be sued in the jurisdiction. 42
While attachment was once used only to coerce a defendant to appear
and to answer,'1 43 it no longer dissolves when an appearance is
entered. 44 Moreover, appearance is no longer even a jurisdictional
necessity.
This article contends that attachment to secure jurisdiction satis-
fies due process requirements only if the debtor has insufficient con-
tacts within the state to support a personal judgment; if there is real
danger that the defendant's assets will be moved from the jurisdiction
before a possible hearing; 145 and, only then, if the court takes a parochial
view and requires enforcement within the state rather than in an-
other state under the full-faith-and-credit clause. 46
Carrington's thesis that quasi in rem jurisdiction has outlived
its usefulness and is no longer needed 47 now has received additional
support from the constitutional prohibition.148 If a court takes the
broadest view of personal and quasi in rem jurisdiction there will
rarely be either necessity or justification for a prehearing seizure to
secure jurisdiction in a suit based upon law or equity.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-31-1 (1972). Recent contrary practice is illustrated
by Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
141. See, e.g., Aldridge v. First Nat'l Bank, 144 So. 469 (Miss. 1932).
142. See, e.g., Gulf Refinishing Co. v. Mauney, 3 So. 2d 844 (Miss. 1941); Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Robertson, 88 So. 883 (Miss. 1921); Imperial Cotton Oil Co. v. Allen, 35 So.
216 (Miss. 1903).
143. "Originally the goods of a defendant who failed to respond to a summons
could be seized, but solely in order to compel his appearance." Note, Some Implications
of Sniadach, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 945 (1970).
144. Clark & Landers, supra note 132, at 368.
145. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). See also
Hawkland, The Seed of Sniadach: Flower or Weed?, 78 COM. L.J. 245, 250 (1973).
146. Hazard, supra note 130.
147. Carrington, supra note 119, at 303.
148. Note, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, supra note
132, at 1032.
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IV. RESOLVING THE CHALLENGE IN ADMIRALTY
This article endorses the legal principles announced in Sniadach-
Fuentes, and supports the position that seizures to secure jurisdiction
meet constitutional standards only if a personal judgment could not be
constitutionally supported or if there is a present danger that the res
will be removed from the national jurisdiction. The Sniadach-Fuentes
restrictions would apply only to cases involving citizens or residents
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and its courts149 because
no judgment of the United States will be enforced in the courts of
another nation unless that nation agrees. 5° The mobility of ships-
the reason for their existence-explains the difference between criteria
used to judge acceptable notice and hearing for United States citizens
and criteria used in admiralty to judge adequate notice and hearing
for persons who neither live nor have assets within the United States.151
149. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 5 (1942).
150. One treatise notes:
As regards judgments, it is to be noted that for a very long period their effectiveness
was limited to the territory of the country where they were made. As the success-
ful plaintiff could not enforce the judgment outside the country where it had
been rendered, he was obliged to institute a fresh action before the courts of the
country where the property of the defendant was situated.
The refusal . . . was based on an exaggerated conception . . . of . . . sovereignty
.... When the judges of a country give an order to enforce a foreign judgment
they makes themselves . . . the servants of the judges who have given that judg-
ment.
The effects of a foreign judgment never operate directly. Recognition can only
be obtained after . . . examination, the form and conditions of which . . . vary
as much according to the nature and effects of the judgments as according to the
country. . . . Some States admit a review over a very wide field: it covers
questions of law (conflict rules, substantive law applied by the foreign judge,
rules of procedure followed by him) as much as questions of fact. .
As an example of . . . States with written provisions which refuse in principle
to enforce foreign judgments one can . . . cite the Netherlands.
Another example . . . in which as a general rule foreign judgments are
neither recognized nor enforced is the Scandinavian countries . . . subject . . .
to exceptions....
Kokkini-Iatridou, Legislation in the Field of Private International Law, in TMC Asser
Instituut, LEs L GISLATIONS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL Psuvt 3, 13-16 (1971) (footnotes
omitted).
151. It is commonly held under the principles of private international law that
the mere physical presence of an asset . . . confers upon states a competence to
apply policy with respect to events occurring elsewhere. It is arguable . . . in rela-
tion to events having no connection with the use of internal waters or even the
oceans-the mere transient presence of a vessel within the effective control of
a state might be treated differently from the presence of other assets. Vessels are
instruments whose primary value arises from their mobility, and there appear
to be sound reasons for preferring that interference with that mobility, be reduced
1975l
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The ultimate goal of any state participating in maritime activities
should be to use its maritime jurisdiction to obtain the maximum
benefit for itself, its citizens, and the domiciliaries of other participating
states. The rules it prescribes may reflect the enforcement problems
that can arise when a judgment is entered against a nonresident, but
these should be uniformly applied. 15 2 The proposed procedures put
forward here would meet this goal and provide significant economic
benefits. But Sniadach-Fuentes do not compel a finding that existing
practice is unconstitutional.
A. Alternative I: Rationalization of the Status Quo
The Court could resolve the conflicts between Sniadach-Fuentes
and present procedure by applying both the concept that power over
the res is jurisdiction,'53 and the in rem concept of personification of
the vessel. 5 4 If Sniadach-Fuentes exempt from their rules seizures
necessary for jurisdiction, 1 5 the Court could declare, a priori, that in
all in rem actions seizure of the res is necessary for jurisdiction to at-
tach. 56 Such a conclusion would be consistent with the Supreme Court
rule governing an in rem action to enforce a maritime lien. That rule
xrequires that the initial step be issuance of a writ arresting the vessel;
I
'
5
the Court's own rule makes arrest necessary to secure jurisdiction.
For a lover of legal fictions, it is arguable that arrest is required by
due process. If a vessel is regarded as a jural person 51-as it is only in
to the minimum compatible with providing security for claims connected with
maritime matters or the shipping business.
M. MCDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 127-28 (1962) (footnotes
omitted).
152. Id. at 17-19.
153. Compare Sturgeon Bay Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. The Yacht Nautilus,
166 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Wis. 1958), and Lewis v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 163 F. Supp.
453 (D. Or. 1958), with Continental Grain Co. v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 268 F.2d
240 (5th Cir. 1959), and Anglo-American Grain Co. v. The S/T Mina D'Amico,
169 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Va. 1959).
154. See United States v. Brig. Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844); The
Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827); United States v. The Little Charles, 26 F. Cas.
979 (No. 15612) (C.C.D. Va. 1818). See generally G. GILMOIR & C. BLACK, supra note 18,
at 483-88.
155. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 & n.23 (1972); Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
156. See note 154 supra.
157. "(1) . . . An action in rem may be brought:
(a) To enforce any maritime lien; . . .
(3) . . . Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a
warrant for the arrest of the vessel . . . and deliver it to the marshal for service."
FRD. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. C.
158. See Carrington, supra note 119.
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an in rem action'5 5-effective notice to that vessel is a prerequisite for
jurisdiction.160 Arrest provides that notice to the only legal entity
being sued-the vessel. Therefore no notice to the owner is necessary.
There are other arguments to support the view that notice to
the owner prior to seizure of his vessel is not required in an in rem
action against the vessel. The Limitation of Liability Act 16'
acknowledges that a ship is a separate legal entity and permits the
owner of a vessel to limit his liability to the value of the vessel and
freight immediately after the voyage.162 If the vessel owner reaps the
benefits of limited liability because of the personification theory, then
he should bear the burden that accompanies the adoption of this
theory: that is, the possibility of an in rem proceeding including the
seizure or arrest of his ship without prior notice to him. Even if notice
to the owner were required, precedent provides another barrier to
change. 13 There is an established maritime rule that considers the
plaintiff-lienor of an in rem action to be part owner of the vessel.
16 4
Hence an "owner" has notice. Finally, advocates of change must
159. See notes 40, 57 supra.
160. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchin-
son, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950).
161. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (1970); FED. R. Civ. P. Su'pp. R. F.
162. 46 U.S.C. § 183 (a) (1970). See also The Titanic, 233 U.S. 718 (1914). How-
ever, § 183 (b) provides that if this amount is insufficient to pay all losses in full,
then the owner of a seagoing vessel shall be liable in respect of loss of life or bodily
injury for the payment of $60 per ton of the vessel's tonnage.
This is similar to the limited liability enjoyed by a corporation. There are some
differences, but the basic rationale is the same in each case. The owner in each case
is shielded from personal liability unless he is personally at fault. See 46 U.S.C. § 183 (a)
(1970) (removing the owner's right to limit liability where the loss is occasioned with
the "privity of knowledge" of the owner). See also Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks,
285 U.S. 502 (1932); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 6-7 (1881).
163. "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience .... [The
law's] form and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to work out desired
results, depend very much upon its past." 0. HOLMES, ThE COMMON LAW 1-2 (1881). The
comment of Mr. Justice Douglas in Sniadach-"The fact that a procedure would pass
muster under a feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to all pro-
perty in its modern forms"-seems to slightly weaken this argument. 395 U.S. at 340.
164. "Under the 'proprietary interest' rule a maritime lienor becomes a part-owner
and must bear the risk of any loss that may follow." Varian, Rank and Priority of Mari-
time Liens, 47 TUL. L. REV. 751 (1973). See also The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113, 115,
116, 122, 123 (1898); Harmer v. Bell (The Bold Buccleugh), 13 Eng. Rep. 884 (P.C.
1851). But it had been thought by some that a creditor's interest in property under
retained title contracts would have influence upon the court in replevin cases. These
hopes were dashed. Hawkland, The Seed of Sniadach: Flower or Weed?, 78 COM. L.J.
245, 249-50 (1973).
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recognize that the Supreme Court is unlikely to hold unconstitutional
the rules for prejudgment arrest promulgated by the Court itself.165
Doctrinal and historical arguments like these offered to justify
maintaining the status quo have not saved other categories of pre-
judgment seizures.1 66 They should not be successful in this case either;
some modification of in rem arrests is necessary so that they conform
to standards of fundamental fairness imposed by Sniadach-Fuentes.
B. Alternative II: Modification of Present Procedure
1. Proposals.-Realistically, the mobility of ships and the transitory
associations that some ships and shipowners share with a state require
a provision for seizures to protect the state's jurisdictional powers over
them. The rule of international law that allows foreign states to choose
which judgments they will enforce increases the credence of this argu-
ment.1 67 If the vessel cannot be seized when there is no other property
165. The Court's power to promulgate admiralty rules did not flow from the
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-73 (1948), Ch. 646, 61 Stat. 961, but rather from the
Permanent Process Act of 1792, Ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 276, under which the Court
promulgated admiralty rules in 1845. Until the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1948),
a difference existed between the power of the Court to promulgate rules in ad-
miralty and at law and equity. The power to change an Act of Congress was not
given in the Act of August 23, 1842, Ch. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 518. But with the enactment
of §§ 2072 & 2073 in 1948, law, equity, and admiralty were on equal footing and
ready for union. Section 2072 was amended to include admiralty and maritime cases
and § 2073 was repealed. Act of Nov. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 1323, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
While the Supreme Court does entertain challenges to the rules it promulgates, "it
will be a rare case where the challenge can succeed." 7A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
.02[3], at 24 (2d ed. 1972).
166. "[P]rocedural rule[s] that may satisfy due process requirements in general
• . . [do] . . . not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case. The fact
that a procedure would pass muster under a feudal regime does not mean it gives
necessary protection to all property in its modern forms." Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969). See also Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360
F. Supp. 1085 (S.D. Me. 1973); Clement v. Four North State Street Corp., 360 F. Supp.
933 (D.N.H. 1973) (foreign attachment of real property held violative of due process
clause of fourteenth amendment); Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972);
MacQueen v. Lambert, 348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Holt v. Brown, 336 F. Supp.
2 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Williams, Creditors
Prejudgment Remedies: Expanding Strictures on Traditional Rights, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 60
(1973); Note, The Innkeeper's Lien in the Twentieth Century, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV.
175 (1971) (innkeeper's prejudgment seizure to secure innkeeper's lien held violative);
Comment, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 823 (1973) (distraint of tenant's property to secure rent
past due held violative).
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 9, comment a at 26 (1965). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §
98 (1969) for the United States rules which allow nonrecognition and nonenforcement if:
the judgment is invalid as measured by standards set by the enforcing state; proceedings
are not "regular"; there is no "opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a
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of the vessel owner within the jurisdiction, a successful plaintiff might
find that his judgment was unenforceable in the domicile of the vessel
owner. Even if a foreign state will enforce a judgment, the expense of
additional lawyers and more litigation may effectively discourage the
plaintiff from seeking to satisfy the judgment.1 68
Nonresident shipowners' 69 and United States shipowners1 70 must
court of competent jurisdiction"; "due citation" is lacking; or if the judgment is not
under "a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice
between the citizens of its own country and those of other countries . Id. at 298-
299.
The Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters and Supplementary Protocol (reproduced 15 AM. J.
CoMp. L. 362 (1967)) allows a state to refuse to enforce any judgment of a foreign
state if the court did not have jurisdiction, art. 4(1). Enforcement may also be refused
as to judgments incompatible with public policy or due process, or if either party had
no opportunity to "fairly" present his case, art. 5(1); judgments obtained by fraud, art.
5 (2); and judgments lis pendens in the enforcing state, art. 5 (3). Several nations having
a large number of vessels flying their flag are not parties to the Convention-e.g., Liberia
and Panama.
See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); M. KATZ & K. BREWsTER, THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSAcrIONS AND RELATIONs 436-94 (1960); H. STEINE. & D. VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 641-772, especially 661-62, 682-83 (England), 662-64
(France), 664-65 (Germany) (1968); Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money
Judgments Abroad and What To Do About It, 42 IowA L. REv. 236 (1957); Yntema, The
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 MIcH. L. REv. 1129 (1935).
Most legal scholars today, in recognition of this national choice, classify the enforce-
ment of foreign judgments as a domestic choice of laws or conflicts question rather than
as a part of the body of international law. H. STEINER & D. VAGTs, supra, at 686-87.
Since reciprocity is one basis for enforcement of foreign judgments, many nations
rely upon international agreements to insure minimal reciprocity. The United States is
not a signatory party to any treaty requiring this country to enforce foreign judgments.
There are constitutional and political problems that probably will effectively bar any
such treaty. The federal structure is a bar to federal encroachment upon state court
or "strictly domestic" matters. The author favors such treaties and believes that the
enforcement of judgments regarding international commerce is never a "strictly domestic"
issue. While Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), upheld the migratory bird
treaty against attack on similar grounds, the Court specifically found that "[h]ere a
national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected
only by national action in concert with that of another power. The subject matter is
only transistorily within the State and has no permanent habitat therein." Id. at 435.
In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), the Court struck down an executive agreement
with Great Britain that allowed servicemen's wives to be tried by courts-martial under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Court specifically recognized the supremacy
of the Constitution over a treaty.
168. The provisions of Article 13 of The Hague Convention, supra note 167, pro-
vide a fairly convenient mode of procedure. However, even this model requires authenti-
cated copies of the decision, translations of necessary documents, and sufficient docu-
ments to establish that the decision fulfills the conditions of the Convention. See art. 13,
ch. 3 of the Hague Convention.
169. "Nonresident shipowners" means shipowners who are not citizens, residents, or
domiciliaries of the United States.
170. "United States shipowners" means shipowners who are residents, citizens, or
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be treated differently. While nonresidents, foreigners, and aliens
should receive the rights and benefits of due process, 171 a distinction
must be made between those cases in which enforcement of a judg-
ment can be satisfied within the United States and those in which it
cannot.' 7' For residents, domiciliaries of the United States, and persons
or corporations having substantial property in the United States, the
general rule should be that no prejudgment seizure can be made be-
fore notice to the owner and a hearing. 73 Admiralty rule B17 present-
ly provides that quasi in rem maritime attachments may occur only
when the plaintiff certifies on oath that "the defendant shall not be
found in the district." This restriction, however, should be extended to
in rem arrests under rules C and E,'7 5 and the phrase "found in the
district" should mean only that the defendant or his insurer is amenable
to suit within the district under modern long-arm statutes. 76 The
plaintiff should be allowed to pursue his claim under both in rem
and in personam principles against any defendant so "found."
domiciliaries of the United States.
171. "(An alien) may not be deprived either by the National Government or by
any state of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Nor may he be
denied the equal protection of the laws." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 598
(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
172. The United States presently discriminates against foreign vessels and ship-
owners in another area of maritime liens. In 1954, the Congress granted to the district
courts the power to execute preferred ship mortgages on foreign ships. The Act con-
tained this discriminatory language:
[S]uch "preferred mortgage lien" in the case of a foreign vessel shall also be
subordinate to maritime liens for repairs, supplies, towage, use of drydock or
marine railway, or other necessaries, performed or supplied in the United States.
46 U.S.C. § 951 (1972).
On the other hand, the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. § 953 (1972), provides that
a preferred mortgage lien on a U.S. flag vessel takes priority over liens for necessaries
under the Maritime Lien Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1972). See Sandstrom, The
Changing International Concept of the Maritime Lien as a Security Right, 47 TUL. L.
REv. 681, 689 (1973).
173. This would be subject to the exceptions made explicit in Fuentes, i.e., the public
weal or where there was a clear and present danger that the res would be removed
from the jurisdiction and that a real threat existed that any judgment rendered would
be uncollectible unless from the res in question.
174. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B.
175. FED. R. Civ. P. SuPP. R. C, E.
176. See Note, The Applicability of Florida Direct Action in the Law of Admiralty,
1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 335 (1973). Several states have enacted long-arm statutes applicable
to nonresident watercraft owners. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 263 (1968); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 75, §§ 2001-02 (1971). For a discussion of these statutes see Cohn, Choice of
Forum in Maritime Personal Injury Torts, 54 ILL. B.J. 966, 975 (1966). See also Sarpy,
Legislation Affecting Practice and Procedure, 17 LA. L. REv. 45, 47-50 (1956); Sarpy,
Louisiana's Watercraft Statute and Federal Maritime Jurisdiction, 29 TUL. L. REv. 111
(1954). For a general view of this area, see Kierr, Use of State Statutes To Effect Service
on a Non-Resident Vessel Owner, 8 LA. B.J. 113 (1960).
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These recommendations can easily be implemented; they have been
used informally in the past. In Canadian Aviator,177 an in rem ac-
tion, the Court used reasoning which supports this position. Because
the Public Vessels Act of 1925178 allows suits in personam against the
United States for negligent operation of government-owned vessels,1 79
the plaintiffs sued invoking both in personam and in rem principles.' °
The Court held that although the Public Vessels Act and the Suits
in Admiralty Act' prohibited the vessel's arrest, they authorized
recovery based upon both in rem principles of admiralty and tradition-
al in personam principles.1s2 Recognizing that the personification theory
created additional liability on in rem principles, the Court relied on
that theory to permit recovery despite lack of either an arrest or a
maritime lien. 183
Several cases have ignored the requirement of seizure or arrest
when the parties filed agreements, appearances, or stipulations. 8 4 In
United States v. Freights of S.S. Mount Shasta 85 a libel in rem against
pending freight was allowed although the money allegedly owed was
not arrested nor taken into custodia legis.'8s Justice Holmes, though
proceeding under the "power is jurisdiction" theory then in vogue,
177. Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945).
178. Ch. 438, 43 Stat. 112 (1925) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1970)).
179. 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1970): "A libel in personam in admiralty may be brought
against the United States ... for damages caused by a vessel of the United States."
180. 324 U.S. at 217.
181. Ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525 (1925) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1970)).
182. 324 U.S. at 219, 220, 227. See also Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States,
272 U.S. 675 (1927).
183. The United States contended that since there was no collision and the ship
was not the efficient causative agent, the accident being caused by the "personal and
independent negligence of (the ship's) officers," there was no liability. 324 U.S. at
218. The Court found liability by specifically recognizing the "personal" liability of
the ship, saying: "[P]ersonification of the vessel, treating it as a juristic person whose
acts and omissions, although brought about by her personnel, are personal acts of the
ship for which, as a juristic person, she is legally responsible, has long been recognized
by this Court." 324 U.S. at 224.
184. In Continental Grain Co. v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 268 F.2d 240 (5th Cir.
1959), the parties proceeded under a letter of undertaking stipulating that the proceeding
should be in rem and any judgment rendered would be paid.
Acceptance of service of process by the owners' attorneys was held to have the
force and effect of seizure in Anglo-American Grain Co., Ltd. v. The S/T Mina D'Amico,
169 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Va. 1959). In Booth S.S. Co. v. Tug Dalzell No. 2, 1966
A.M.C. 2615 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the filing of a general appearance was held to waive the
question of whether the vessel was within the jurisdiction of the court. For a con-
trary view see Rogers, Enforcement of Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 47 TUL. L. REV.
767, 769-71 (1973) (taking the traditional view that there is no jurisdiction without an
arrest and seizure of the vessel).
185. 274 U.S. 466 (1927).
186. Id.
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found a basis for asserting jurisdiction by observing that jurisdiction
"begins before actual seizure" since "[h]ere the debtor is within the
power of the court and therefore the debt, if there is one, is also
within it."'1 7
An additional recommendation is that the presence of the ship (the
res) within the district should confer jurisdiction to render a judg-
ment enforceable throughout the nation.' Recently the Supreme
Court of Florida created by decision a right of direct action against the
insurer of the defendant.8 9 This rule should also be adopted by the
United States Supreme Court for all maritime in rem actions; this
would help to assure a successful plaintiff that his judgment will be
satisfied. While the Court could use this theory to give a constitution-
ally acceptable and enforceable judgment against a nonresident' 9 or
187. Id. at 471. New and different concepts of the nature of property have
weakened the underlying basis of the power theory. See, e.g., Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in
Law, 86 U. PA. L. Rav. 691 (1938); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
188. "It is commonly held under the principles of private international law that
the mere physical presence of an asset, movable or immovable, confers upon states a
competence to apply policy with respect to events occurring elsewhere." Moreover, "[the
competence claimed may be asserted against owners or vessels or both. The events giving
rise to controversy and assertions of competence may occur within the territorial bounds
of the coastal state, or beyond its bounds, as on the high seas or within the
territory of other states." M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
OCEANS 127 (1962) (footnote omitted).
In Kane v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 394 F.2d 131 (3rd Cir. 1968), the
S.S. Mikhail Kutuzov, operated by The Black Sea State Steamship Line, was in the Port
of Philadelphia in 1946. A ship's agency agreement was in effect between Black Sea
and a U.S. stevedoring concern. In 1949, a longshoreman injured while working on the
vessel sued the U.S.S.R., Black Sea, and others for his injuries while the Mikhail
Kutuzov was in port. Service was had upon the stevedoring concern as agent. Black Sea
did not appear, and default was entered. A final decree was entered on the default.
Later Black Sea moved to set aside service and default and open the judgment. In
denying the relief, the Court said:
Black Sea had sufficient contacts within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to
establish in personam jurisdiction over Black Sea, McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 ... (1957), and . . . service of process was properly effected
under Rule 4 (d), Fed. R. Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.
Id. at 132.
189. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969). See Note, The Applicability of
Florida Direct Action in the Law of Admiralty, supra note 176.
190. A recent case, Mackensworth v. American Trading Transp. Co., 367 F. Supp.
373 (E.D. Pa. 1973), upholding the constitutionality of process by the Pennsylvania
long-arm statute, has the distinction of a verse opinion:
Plaintiff found defendant had a ship here in June '72,
but defendant says that ship's business is through.
Asserting that process is amiss,
it has filed a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff's counsel, whose name is Harry Lore,
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his insurer, no seizure should be permitted before a hearing unless all
the Fuentes prerequisites are met.','
If the present liberal prerequisites for a defendant to be "within
the power of the court" were complemented by such a rule permitting
direct actions against insurers,'192 rarely would a case require an arrest
read defendant's brief and found it a bore.
Instead of a reply brief, he acted pretty quick
and responded with a clever limerick:
"Admiralty process is hoary
With pleadings that tell a sad story
Of Libels in Rem-The bane of sea-faring men
The moral:
Better personally served than be sorry."
The first question is whether, under the facts,
defendant has done business here to come under Pennsylvania's long arm acts.
If we find that it has, we must reach question two,
whether that act so applied is constitutional under Washington v. International Shoe.
And we hold that the recent visit of defendant's ship to Philadelphia's port
is doing business enough to bring it before this Court.
We note, however, that the amended act's grammar,
is enough to make any thoughtful lawyer stammer.
The particular problem which deserves mention,
is whether a single act done for pecuniary gain also requires a future intention.
As our holding suggests, we believe the answer is no,
and feel that is how the Pa. appellate cases will go.
The visit of defendant's ship is not yet very old,
and so we feel constrained to hold that under traditional notions of substantial
justice and fair play,
defendant's constitutional argument does not carry the day.
Finding that service of process is bona fide,
the motion to dismiss is hereby denied.
So that this case can now get about its ways,
defendant shall file an answer within 21 days.
id. at 374-77 (footnotes omitted).
191. The presence of the ship as res in the jurisdiction should be regarded as
"the transactional event that provides a legitimate basis for plenary jurisdiction pur-
suant to the minimum-contacts rule." Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Juris-
diction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241, 282. See also the agreed bases for jurisdiction in Supple-
mentary Protocol to The Hague Convention, supra note 167. The protocol, reproduced in
15 AM. J. CoMp. L. 369 (1967), includes among grounds for jurisdiction: "(a) [T]he
presence in the territory of the State of origin of property belonging to the defendant,
or the seizure by the plaintiff of property situated there .... " Id. at 370 (emphasis
added).
192. The right to bring a direct action against a marine insurer under state
procedures was recognized by the Court in (The Jane Smith) Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954), even though the ship and its owner might escape liability
because of the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (1970). See also Olympic
Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
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or seizure before the court possessed power to render an enforceable
judgment against a United States resident. To prevent fraudulent
transfers or removals from the jurisdiction, the "secret" maritime lien
should be sustained until satisfaction of the judgment.
2. Benefits.-There are several economic benefits to be had by
resolving the challenge in this fashion. Reduction in the costs of arrest
-the time lost from commerce, the expenses incurred to free a vessel
held in a distant port, and the achievement of a more equitable judicial
system-would more than compensate for a plaintiff's apparent loss of
leverage in specific cases. A nearly complete elimination of prehearing
arrests or seizures of vessels accompanied by acceptance of the principles
of long-arm jurisdiction and direct action against the vessels' insurers
should also substantially increase economic benefits to the nation.
It is true that preferred ship mortgages1 93 are foreclosed in ad-
miralty by an in rem proceeding,194 but for these cases, a summary
hearing before seizure to show default should suffice. The cost of this
hearing should not appreciably increase the expense of the already
elaborate foreclosure procedure.'95 Moreover, because most ships are
financed by fleet mortgage arrangements, a single hearing would usually
settle the disposition of all the ships in the fleet.196
It is also important to remember that arrest and attachment of a
vessel are expensive for both the plaintiff and the defendant. Before
he serves process, the marshal must collect from the plaintiff a deposit
sufficient to cover the costs of arresting and maintaining the seized
vessel.1 97 In comparison with other court costs, those collected for a
989 (1970). In Quinones v. Coral Rock, Inc., 258 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1972), the court recognized the right to bring a direct action against a marine insurer
in a personal injury action.
193. 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84 (1970); G. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN TrE
UNITED STATES 442 (1939).
194. 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1970).
195. For a discussion of the enforcement of such liens, see Rogers, Enforcement of
Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 47 TUL. L. REV. 767 (1973).
196. Mahla, Some Problems in Vessel Financing-A Lender's Lawyer's View, 47
Tum. L. REV. 629, 638-39 (1973).
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1921 (1970). FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. E(4)(e) specifically states
that its provisions neither alter nor change the effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1921 (1970) upon
delegation of the expense of seizing and keeping the property arrested or attached, or
"the requirement of deposits to cover such expenses." The costs secured include keepers'
fees, the expenses for routine servicing of the vessel, guards' fees, and insurance. The
statute requires the marshal to collect, in advance, a deposit sufficient to cover initial
costs, and to charge, at subsequent intervals, additional amounts as they become
necessary.
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vessel seizure are substantial.198 The vessel owner must post a bond to
obtain the release of his ship before the dispute is resolved. 9,
Technological advances in communications have diminished the
need to impose liens for master's contracts to furnish supplies and
services "on the credit of the ship. '' 20 0 The appearance of ship agents
and brokers, the development of an international credit system, and
a general improvement in shipping administration have also con-
tributed to the decline in the popularity of these liens.2 01 The 1967
convention 20 2 almost eliminated master's contract liens and actually
did subordinate those that remained to preferred ship's mortgages.
The secret nature of maritime liens is regarded by bankers as a
threat to long-term, high-level mortgage credit. Restricting the scope
of these liens20 3 would encourage the flow of money from the bankers
to finance national and international fleet expansion.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should amend the Supplemental Admiralty
Rules to acknowledge the restrictions of prejudgment seizures and to
reconcile the conflict between the rules and those restrictions. The
difference between seizures necessary for jurisdiction and seizures to
preserve a res to satisfy a judgment should be made explicit. The
198. As to what the individual marshal's office considers an adequate deposit
to cover the various expenses likely to be incurred, these amounts vary from district
to district, currently ranging as high as $2,000 for ten days' expenses.
The principal expenses confronting the marshal in his custody of a vessel are
for insurance, wharfage, and guards.
The insurance procured by the marshall is under a master policy arranged by
the Government and providing $1,000,000 liability protection, as well as standard
hull and P & I coverage, all of which inure to the benefit and protection of the
Government, as bailee of the property, not to the benefit of the shipowner or
claimants, who must provide their own additional coverage if desired.
Rogers, Enforcement of Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 47 TUL. L. REV. 767, 775 (1973)
(footnote omitted).
199. FEo. R. Civ. P. Sure. R. E(5)(a) provides for release on giving bond
or stipulation in an agreed amount or, failing that, an amount sufficient to cover
plaintiff's claim or the appraised value of the property, whichever is smaller. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2464 (1970) provides for release in all cases except forfeitures under the laws of
the United States upon giving bond in double the amount claimed by the libelant.
Since the effect is the same, the procedure provided by the rule seems cheaper and,
hence, more desirable.
200. Sandstr6m, The Changing International Concept of the Maritime Lien as a
Security Right, 47 TUL. L. REv. 681, 686 (1973).
201. Id.
202. 1967 Brussels Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages. See 3 P. MANCA,
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW 381-437 (1971).
203. Sandstr6m, supra note 200, at 684-85.
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Court should still recognize that, although jurisdiction requirements
may be satisfied without a seizure, a real necessity for seizure may re-
main because of insolvency, fraud, or international conflicts of law.
The rules should also recognize that the presence of the ship within
the jurisdiction gives the court in personam jurisdiction over the
owner. Insurers should be subject to direct actions either jointly with
the defendant or as substitute defendants. Like suits against the United
States, these suits should be based on both in personam and in rem
principles. Through suits based on in rem principles, the owner could
then be made responsible for the actions of charterers and others who
otherwise might insulate him from liability.
The adoption of these suggestions would facilitate maximum use of
the nation's maritime assets. 20 4 The economic waste caused by the de-
tention of arrested vessels would be substantially reduced.20 5 Absent
would be the fundamental unfairness of coercive seizures that " 'shock
the conscience' of the Court and 'offend the community's sense of fair
play and decency' because of the 'ignoble short cut' of legal process and
'the stealthy encroachment' on . . . constitutional rights .... . 20
Codification of these suggestions would reduce the impact of "one of
the . . . most drastic remedies known to modern civil law; . . . [the]
arrest of property by an admiralty proceeding in rem."
2 0 7
204. That expeditious legal procedures were an aid to a nation's sea power was
recognized early on in England. W. WELWOD, AN ABRIDGEMENT OF ALL SEA-LAwE.s 17
(1613).
205. It is arguable, however, that for the application of policy generally-that is,
in relation to events having no connection with the use of internal waters or
even the oceans-the mere transient presence of a vessel within the effective control
of a state might be treated differently from the presence of other assets. Vessels are
instruments whose primary value arises from their mobility, and there appear to
be sound reasons for preferring that interference with that mobility be reduced
to the minimum compatible with providing security for claims connected with
maritime matters or the shipping business. Such a policy . . . would preclude
attachment of a vessel for obtaining jurisdiction or security in respect of disputes
arising out of events wholly extraneous to the use of the oceans.
M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, TIHE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 127-28 (1962) (footnote
omitted).
206. McCreary, Going for the Jugular Vein: Arrests and Attachments in Ad-
niralty, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 19 (1967).
207. Id.
